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Protecting the Child Sexual Abuse Victim from
Courtroom Trauma after Coy v. Iowa
Beginning in the early 1980s, growing public awareness of the devastating
emotional effects of child abuse led many state legislatures to enact statutes to
insulate victims from the additional trauma often associated with courtroom testimony. 1 A common statutory approach was to excuse the victim from viewing
his alleged attacker while testifying. 2 In Coy v. Iowa 3 the United States Supreme
Court struck down such a statute, holding that the sixth amendment requires an
unobstructed visual encounter between accuser and accused. 4 The Court recognized that the sight of her abuser might upset the testifying child but explicitly
declined to decide whether a witness could ever be excused from physically confronting the defendant. Instead, the Court tentatively proposed a test, of uncertain precedential value, for visual-confrontation exceptions, then invalidated the
Iowa statute for failing to meet this standard. 5 The Court's failure to make a
definite pronouncement on the constitutionality of visual-confrontation excep-

tions leaves in limbo at least thirty-six child witness protection statutes now in

force in twenty-five states. 6 In addition, the Court failed to provide substantial
guidance to the state courts, leaving them to struggle to determine if their statutes meet the test proposed by the Supreme Court-a test of great ambiguity
and questionable precedential value.
This Note will examine the importance the Coy Court attaches to the visual
confrontation between the defendant and the child witness. The Note recognizes that strict enforcement of this requirement may effectively preclude the use
of nonconfrontation testimony. Such a preclusion is not inescapable, however.
The Note will analyze the Maryland child witness protection statute, which
should survive an appropriately vigorous application of the Coy exception test
1. Bulkley, Evidentiaryand ProceduralTrends in State Legislationand OtherEmerging Legal
Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 89 DICK. L. REv. 645, 645-46 (1985). See generally Libai, The
Protectionofthe Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the CriminalJusticeSystem, 15 WAYNE L. REV.
977 (1969) (describing possibility of long-term emotional harm stemming from insensitive treatment
of child sex abuse victims in the courts).
2. Twenty-two states allow child witness testimony via one-way closed circuit television. The
child testifies from a room adjacent to the courtroom. Only the prosecuting and defense attorneys,
and perhaps a supporting adult, are physically present with the child. The defendant, judge, and
jury view the witness on a television monitor placed in the courtroom, but the child has no opportunity to view the defendant. See, eg., ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1988).
Eighteen states allow child testimony via in-trial screening of a previously videotaped deposition, taken in the defendant's physical absence. E.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4251, -4253(B),
(C) (Supp. 1987). In twelve states, the videotaped deposition must be in lieu of the child's live
testimony; neither the prosecution nor the defense can call the child to the stand at trial. E.g., ARK.
CODE ANN.

§ 16-44-203 (1987).

A survey of state child witness protection statutes is collected in Brief for The American Bar
Association (amicus curiae) app. A, Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988) (No. 86-6757).
3. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
4. Id. at 2801. The sixth amendment states in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions,
U.S.
the accused shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him ....
CONsT. amend. VI.
5. See infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
6. See supra note 2.
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and result in a relaxation of the visual confrontation rule under circumstances in
which the child, the public, and the defendant all benefit from the exception. '
In Coy defendant was convicted of sexually molesting two thirteen-year-old
girls. Pursuant to an Iowa statute authorizing witness protection measures in
any sexual abuse trial involving a victim under fourteen years of age, a screen
was placed in front of defendant during each girl's testimony. 7 Lighting in the
courtroom was arranged so that the victims could not see defendant, but he
could see the witnesses dimly through the screen. In accordance with statutory
requirements, each girl was informed that defendant could see and hear her.
Appealing to the Iowa Supreme Court, defendant Coy presented the "very
narrow objection that the girls could not see" him as they testified and contended that this violated his sixth amendment right to confrontation. 8 He also
claimed that use of the screen had "created a strong and prejudicial inference of
guilt, violating his [due process] right to a fair trial."9 The Iowa court held that
use of the screen did not offend the sixth amendment because the primary rights
historically protected by the confrontation clause- cross-examination and display of witness demeanor-were not diminished by the procedure. 10 The court
also rejected Coy's due process argument, reasoning that "[tihe jury, already
aware of the charges and their embarrassing nature, likely concluded the screen
was being used to reduce the trauma necessarily attendant to the children's testimony" rather than to indicate the defendant's guilt. 1
The United State Supreme Court reversed on the sixth amendment issue.
Writing for a plurality of four, 12 Justice Scalia emphasized the literal meaning of
the word "confront." 1 3 He noted that the word is derived from Latin roots for
"opposed" and "forehead." 14 Hence, it is simply "'a matter of English'" that
the sixth amendment "confers at least 'a right to meet face to face all those who
appear and give evidence at trial.' "15
7. IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (Vest Supp. 1988). The statute provides, in pertinent part,
The court may require a party be confined to an adjacent room or behind a screen or
mirror that permits the party to see and hear the child during the child's testimony, but
does not allow the child to see or hear the party. However, if a party is so confined, the
court shall take measures to insure that the party and counsel can confer during the testimony and shall inform the child that the party can see and hear the child during testimony.
Id. Iowa also has provisions allowing the use of two-way closed circuit television testimony and use
of the child's previously videotaped deposition testimony. Id. Iowa appears to be unique in authorizing use of an obstructing screen in the courtroom as an alternative to other child witness protection
procedures.
8. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2806 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
9. State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730, 733 (Iowa 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
10. Id. at 733-34.
11. Id. at 735.
12. Eight members of the Court participated. Justice Scalia wrote for the plurality, joined by
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion in which
Justice White joined. See infra text accompanying notes 29-35. Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting
opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined. See infra note 35. Justice Kennedy took no part in
the consideration or decision of this case.
13. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2800.
14. Id.
15. Id. (quoting California v. Green, 379 U.S. 149, 175 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). Prior
to Coy, a New Jersey court criticized this reasoning. State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 484
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Justice Scalia noted that the right to confront one's accusers has survived
from Biblical times to become a part of American folklore.16 The endurance of
the confrontation right indicated to the plurality "that there is something deep
in human nature that regards face-to-face confrontation between accused and
accuser as 'essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution.' "17 Justice Scalia

implied that a visual encounter always had been central to the right of confrontation and denied that recent sixth amendment preoccupation with cross-exami-

nation and hearsay exclusion indicated that these rights alone secure the full
range of confrontation benefits.'

8

Rather, these rights are mere derivatives of

the the clause's "irreducible literal meaning"-the face-to-face encounter. 19
The plurality asserted that the underlying function of the confrontation
clause is to "'ensur[e] the integrity of the fact-finding process'" and that a visual encounter independently facilitates this goal. 20 Gazing upon the defendant,

the witness will feel a moral obligation to testify truthfully. 2 1 Alternatively, a
witness may have difficulty lying effectively when facing an innocent defendant
who knows the truth. 22 Moreover, a witness' choice not to direct his gaze upon
23
the defendant may have independent value as demeanor evidence.

A.2d 1330 (1984). Sheppard characterized as "amusing legal pedantry" an early Utah case holding
that the sixth amendment required a face-to-face confrontation "on the absurd ground that the dictionaries define 'confront' as meaning 'to bring face to face.'" Id. at 428, 484 A.2d at 1340 (quoting
5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1399 (Chadbourne Rev. 1974) (criticizing State v. Mannion, 19 Utah
505, 57 P. 542 (1899))).
16. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2800-01. President Eisenhower spoke of the right to confront one's adversaries in an address to the B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League. The President recounted his
boyhood in Abilene, Kansas, where it was a part of Wild Bill Hickock's code that "'[you] meet
anyone face to face with whom you disagree.... you could get away with almost anything, as long
as the bullet was in the front.'" Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 372-73 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting Eisenhower).
17. Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2801 (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965)).
18. "We have never doubted.., that the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a faceto-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact." Id. at 2800. But cf.Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) ("an adequate opportunity for cross-examination may satisfy the
clause even in the absence of physical confrontation").
19. Id at 2803.
20. Id. at 2802 (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 2662 (1987)).
21. Id. at 2802; accord, United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979) ("in some
undefined but real way recollection, veracity, and communication are influenced by face-to-face challenge"). However, some child witnesses are intimidated by confrontation, which may detract from
the effectiveness or veracity of their testimony. See Burkett v. State, 439 So. 2d 737, 746-47 (Ala.
App. 1983); Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 230 (Ky. 1986); State v. Daniels, 484 So. 2d
941, 943 (La. App. 1986). One commentator, grappling with the confrontation issue in an incest
case, reasoned that:
"the right to confront does not confer upon an accused the right to intimidate. The reliability of an abused child's testimony does not depend upon his or her ability to withstand
the psychological trauma of testifying in a courtroom under the unwavering gaze of a
parent who, although a possible abuser, has also been provider, protector, and parent."
Brief for Judge Charles B. Schudson (amicus curiae) at 12, Coy v. Iowa, 108 S.Ct. 2798 (1988) (No.
86-6757) (quoting Commonwealth v. Ludwig, No. 02883, slip op. at 13 (Pa. Super. Ct. Oct. 30,
1986)).
22. Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2802. But see supra note 21 and infra note 53.
23. Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2802. "The Confrontation Clause does not, of course, compel the witness
to fix his eyes upon the defendant; he may studiously look elsewhere, but the trier of fact will draw
its own conclusions." Id.; cf.Herbert v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 671, 172 Cal. Rptr.
850, 855 (1981) ("A witness' reluctance to face the accused may be a product of fabrication rather
than fear and embarrassment.").
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The plurality did not deny that a child victim-witness might be upset by the
sight of her abuser, but considered this emotional effect vital to the truth-finding
purpose of confrontation. Justice Scalia reasoned, "face-to-face presence may
...upset the truthful rape victim or abused child; but by the same token it may
confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult." 24 Implying that the burdens attendant to ensuring a fair trial must
fall upon the accuser rather than the accused, the Justice concluded: "It is a
'25
truism that constitutional protections have costs."
The Court condemned the Iowa statute because it authorized use of the
obstructing screen for any child sexual abuse victim, rather than requiring findings that an individual witness needed "special protection."' 26 Although expressly declining to decide whether exceptions to the visual confrontation rule
can ever be constitutionally permissible, the plurality tentatively proposed a twopronged exception test. The first prong is fulfilled by a "necessity finding," a
showing that an exception to the visual-confrontation rule is necessary in the
case at bar. The second prong is fulfilled by a determination that an important
public policy would be furthered by allowing the exception. 27 The plurality,
joined by the concurring Justices, emphasized the need for necessity findings
individualized to the child in question, eschewing the notion that a "legislatively
28
imposed presumption of trauma" would suffice.
In a concurring opinion joined by Justice White, Justice O'Connor agreed
that use of the screen had violated Coy's sixth amendment rights, but wrote
separately "to make clear that nothing in today's decision necessarily dooms
[legislative] efforts... to protect child witnesses."' 29 O'Connor cited with approval several state statutes that seek to protect child witnesses from "exposure
to the harsh atmosphere of the typical courtroom" by allowing them to testify
from an adjacent room via closed circuit television. 30 Such "procedures raise no
substantial Confrontation Clause problem [when] they involve testimony in the
31
presence of the defendant."1
Addressing specifically those procedures that seek to shield the child witness from viewing his attacker, O'Connor emphasized that "a defendant's 'right
24. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. The plurality's analysis of Coy under this exception test may be a suggestion that the
test will be applied in future cases or it may be merely a direct rebuttal of the State's argument "that
the confrontation interest at stake ... was outweighed by the necessity of protecting victims of
sexual abuse." Id. at 2802.
The "necessary-for-an-important-public-policy" or "strict scrutiny" test has been applied repeatedly by the Court when examining the constitutionality of an exception to a fundamental right.
Long v. State, 694 S.W.2d 185, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,155
(1973); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S 516, 524

(1960)).
28. Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2803.
29. Id. at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
30. Id. (O'Connor, J.,concurring) (citing ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1987); CAL. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 1347 (West Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55 (Supp. 1987); N.Y. CaIM. PROC.
LAW §§ 65.00-65.30 (McKinney Supp. 1988)).
31. Id. (O'Connor, 3., concurring).
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physically to face those who testify against him,' is not absolute."' 32 The sixth
amendment preference for face-to-face confrontation "'may, in appropriate
cases, bow to accomodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.' ,,3 O'Connor approved the plurality's exception test, including the need
for individualized necessity findings. She opined that the public policy prong
almost invariably is satisfied because most states consider protection of child
witnesses an important public policy. 34 O'Connor was optimistic that the sixth
amendment would not bar all child witness protection procedures and that "the
strictures of the Confrontation Clause may give way to the compelling state interest of protecting child witnesses" when proper case-specific necessity findings
35
are made.
36
Although the confrontation clause "comes to us on faded parchment,"
there has not been steadfast agreement on the scope of rights it confers. The
United States Supreme Court has noted that confrontation implies "two types of
protections for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face those who testify against him and the right to conduct cross-examination.1 37 At various
times, however, members of the Court also have attributed to the confrontation
clause the right to be present at trial,3 8 to have the jury observe the demeanor of
testifying witnesses, 39 to be present at pre-trial proceedings, 4° to exclude hearsay, 4 1 to assist and communicate with one's attorney, 42 and to exclude evidence
43
of co-felons' convictions.
In light of the number and variety of derivative rights attributed to the
confrontation clause, it is not surprising that state courts called upon to interpret
child protective measures have used a variety of analyses either to accept or
32. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987)).
33. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)).
34. Id. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring); accord Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457
U.S. 596, 607 (1982); State v. Vigil, 103 N.M. 583, 586, 711 P.2d 28, 31 (1985); Long v. State, 694
S.W.2d 185, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
35. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting
opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined. The dissenters considered use of the screen a
"minimal... infringement on appellant's Confrontation Clause interests," easily outweighed by the
important state interest of receiving competent child testimony. Id. at 2806 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In addition, the dissenters expressed concern that preoccupation with the face-to-face encounter might cause states "attempting to adopt innovations to facilitate the testimony of child-victims of
sex abuse to sacrifice other, more central, confrontation interests, such as the right to cross-examine"
and the right to put witness demeanor evidence before the jury. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The dissenters further disagreed that a literal right of face-to-face encounter is of ultimate importance to the confrontation clause, noting that it is violated in every instance in which hearsay of
an unavailable declarant is admitted. Id. at 2807 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
36. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 173-74 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
37. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987).
38. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
39. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 n.6 (1980); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43
(1895).
40. Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2668-69 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
41. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63.
42. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2668 (Marshall, J., dissenting); cf. United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d
815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979) (deposition taken while defendant secretly listened over intercom violated
confrontation clause because defendant not physically present and because defendant could not communicate simultaneously with attorney).
43. Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 54-55 (1899).
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reject the procedures. Courts that have allowed protective procedures have

done so on theories that the demands of confrontation are fulfilled by the defendant's presence in the courtroom, 44 the defendant's one-way view of the witness, 4 5 presentation of demeanor evidence of sufficient quality for the jury to
assess witness credibility, 46 or the witness' appearance before the cross-examining defense counsel. 47 Other courts have recognized that protective measures
may abridge the defendant's confrontation rights, but have allowed the procedures because the need to protect child witnesses outweighs a slight infringement
on the defendant's rights. 48 Some courts that have disallowed child witness protective procedures have been troubled by the lack of physical confrontation between the accuser and the accused. 49 Other disallowing courts have cited a lack

ofjudicial power to employ such extraordinary measures in the absence of statutory authority 50 or have criticized the particular procedures for failing to pro5
vide any semblance of confrontation.

1

Although state courts have disagreed on the propriety or legal rationales
44. See, eg., Burkett v. State, 439 So. 2d 737, 747 (Ala. Ct. App. 1983) (defendant whose
physical proximity upset child confined to defense table where his view of witness may have been
partially obscured).
45. See, eg., State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 425, 484 A.2d 1330, 1338-40 (1984) (upholding one-way closed circuit television testimony and rejecting defendant's argument that the sixth
amendment requires a literal interpretation of the word "confront"); cf. McGuire v. State, 288 Ark.
388, 706 S.W.2d 360 (1986) (allowing in-trial use of deposition videotaped in defendant's physical
presence).
46. See, eg., State v. Melendez, 135 Ariz. 390, 392-93, 661 P.2d 654, 656-57 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1982) (allowing in-trial use of deposition taken and videotaped in defendant's physical presence and
rejecting defendant's contention that taping produced demeanor evidence of constitutionally insufficient quality); People v. Algarin, 129 Misc. 2d 1016, 1021, 498 N.Y.S.2d 977, 981 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1986) (upholding two-way closed circuit television testimony and rejecting defendant's argument
that sufficient demeanor evidence can be presented only when witness physically faced with jury); see
also State v. Strable, 313 N.W.2d 497, 500-01 (Iowa 1981) (upholding use of blackboard to separate
witness and defendant on theory that confrontation satisfied by the defendant's opportunity for
cross-examination and the jury's ability to observe the witness).
47. See, eg., State v. Cooper, 291 S.C. 351, 356, 353 S.E.2d 451,454 (1987) (upholding one-way
closed circuit television procedure because defense counsel in adjacent room with testifying child,
even though defendant in courtroom); cf.Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 230 (Ky. 1986)
(confrontation clause satisfied when defendant and jury watched closed circuit television testimony
and defendant had uninterrupted radio contact with counsel).
48. See, eg., State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683, 707, 529 A.2d 1245, 1256 (1987) (face-to-face
confrontation preferred, but videotaping outside defendant's physical presence allowable if child
would suffer harm by exposure to defendant), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1017 (1988); People v. Henderson, 132 Misc. 2d 51, 53, 503 N.Y.S.2d 238, 240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) ("compelling State interest in
protecting the emotional well-being of child sex offense victims more than outweigh[s] . . [the]
minimal infringement of defendant's rights").
49. See, eg., Herbert v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 668, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850, 853
(1981) ("By allowing the child to testify against defendant without having to look at him or be
looked at by him, the trial court not only denied defendant the right to confrontation, but also
foreclosed an effective method for determining veracity."); State v. Mannion, 19 Utah 505, 511, 57 P.
542, 543 (1899) (literal intepretation of "confront" requires a face-to-face encounter).
50. See, eg., Hochheiser v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 783-87, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273,
276-79 (1984) (in absence of statutory authority, court lacked inherent power to allow closed circuit
television testimony); People v. Johnson, 118 Ill. 2d 501, 505, 517 N.E.2d 1070, 1074-75 (1987)
(striking down videotaped testimony for lack of statutory authority).
51. See, eg., State v. Warford, 223 Neb. 368, 377-78, 389 N.W.2d 575, 581-82 (1986) (disallowing videotaped testimony where questioning conducted by child's psychotherapist in absence of defendant and defense counsel); Long v. State, 694 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (same), aff'd
en banc, 742 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1301 (1988).
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underlying the use of child witness protective procedures, a common theme runs
through the cases: "The essential purpose of the confrontation clause is truth-

finding."'5 2 In Coy the United States Supreme Court asserted that visual confrontation between accuser and accused enhances this truth-finding function. A
majority of Justices surmised that face-to-face confrontation exerts upon the witness a moral pressure to testify truthfully53 and elevated this moral effect to a

position of supremacy within the group of confrontation rights. 54 Justice Scalia
noted that other confrontation rights to which exceptions have been allowednamely cross-examination and display of demeanor evidence-were only im-

plied by the confrontation clause.55 In spite of the plurality's tentative exception
test, however, Justice Scalia insinuated that the visual confrontation right is so
essential to the clause that it might never be subordinated to competing
56

interests.

The Coy Court decided that an entire array of long-recognized confrontation safeguards did not provide the defendant sufficient constitutional benefit in

the absence of visual confrontation. The defendant in Coy did not dispute that
the girls' testimony "was given under oath, [and] was subject to unrestricted

cross-examination."' 57 The screen did not obstruct the jury's view of the girls or
52. Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 509, 530 A.2d 275, 281 (1987).
53. Some experts believe that children, unlike adults, are not influenced to truthful testimony
by the stem courtroom atmosphere. Face-to-face confrontation with an abuser who is also a familiar
adult may exacerbate the child's fear and further militate against his truthful testimony. Consider
the following, offered by a psychiatrist at a hearing to determine the propriety of taking a child abuse
victim's testimony via closed circuit television:
An adult witness, testifying in court, surrounded by the usual court atmosphere,
aware of a black-robed judge, a jury, attorneys, members of the public, uniformed attendants, a flag, and religious overtones, is more likely to testify truthfully. The opposite is true
of a child, particularly when the setting involves a relative accused by her of sexual abuse.
She becomes fearful, guilty, anxious, and traumatized. In most cases, she will have been
exposed to both pleasant and abusive associations with the accused. As a consequence, she
has ambivalent feelings. Anger against the relative is opposed by feelings of care, not only
for him but also for other family members who may be harmed by a conviction. There is
guilt as well as satisfaction in the prospect of sending the abuser to prison. These mixed
feelings, accompanied by the fear, guilt, and anxiety, mitigate the truth, producing inaccurate testimony.
State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 416, 484 A.2d 1330, 1332 (1984).
54. Within the constellation of rights granted under the Confrontation Clause, the right to
cross-examine traditionally has been regarded as primary and indispensable and has been described
as the "greatest legal engine ever invented for discovery of the truth." 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1367, at 32 (3d ed. 1940). Thus, at one time, the Court agreed with Wigmore that:
"The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination. The opponent demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of
cross-examination ......
Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and
the truth of his testimony are tested.
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974) (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, supra § 1395, at 123) (emphasis omitted).
55. Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2802-03.
56. Id. "To hold that our determination of what implications [from the confrontation clause]
are reasonable must take into account other important interests is not the same as holding that we
can identify exceptions, in light of other important interests, to the irreducible literal meaning of the
clause .... ." Id. at 2803.
57. Id. at 2806 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting).
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the girls' view of the jury.58 The girls were informed that the defendant could
see and hear them.5 9 The defendant had unrestricted contemporaneous ability

to confer with his counsel during the girls' testimony' ° In sum, although Coy
was afforded every other significant confrontation protection guaranteed by the
Court to defendants in the past, a majority of Justices concluded that the defendant's confrontation rights were violated because he had not received the truth61
enhancing benefit of visual confrontation during the children's testimony.

Given that a majority of Justices perceived the face-to-face encounter to be
crucial to the Confrontation Clause, it is not surprising that the Court reversed
the Iowa Supreme Court. What is surprising is the plurality's seemingly contradictory indication that it might consider relaxing the physical confrontation requirement when such an exception would be necessary to further an important
public policy. 62 Of course, the plurality did not elaborate on the two-pronged
58. Id. While Professor Wigmnore would not have agreed with the Coy plurality that visual
contact is a significant confrontation right, he would have attached some importance to the fact that
each girl could see the jury as she testified. See 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 54, § 1395. Although
Wigmore believed that the primary purpose of confrontation was to guarantee cross-examination, he
also postulated that reliability was enhanced by a "certain subjective moral effect... produced upon
the witness." Id. Wigmore supposed, however, that this effect did not "arise from the confrontation
of the opponent and the witness," but from "the witness' presence before the tribunal." Id. (emphasis omitted).
59. This was required by statute. See supra note 7.
60. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2806 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61. There is no discussion of whether the child witnesses in Coy were subject to a competency
hearing. If so, that would serve as yet another guarantee of reliability. The purpose of a competency
hearing is to determine whether the child can recollect and narrate facts coherently and to investigate whether the child has a moral sense of the obligation to testify truthfully. Kentucky v. Stincer,
107 S.CL 2658, 2665 (1987). But cf. Comment, The Competency Requirementfor the Child Victim
of SexualAbuse: Must We Abandon It?, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV.245 (1985) (suggesting that competency hearings should be abolished and that a child's communication skills bear only on the weight
of his testimony).
62. A factor in the decision not to preclude future confrontation exceptions may have been that
the facts of Coy do not represent a fact pattern present in most child sex abuse cases. For example,
the victims in Coy were thirteen years old, whereas approximately one-third of child sex abuse victiros
are under age six. Bulkley, supra note 1,at 647. In addition, defendant Coy, a neighbor, was
neither an authority figure to the girls nor a likely object of their affections. In a great majority of
child sex abuse cases, however, the perpetrator is a parent or other relative. Note, The Testimony of
Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARv. L. REV.806, 807
n.14 (1985).
Another possible explanation for the plurality's reluctance to seal the fate of the confrontation
exception may be the number and variety of existing child witness protection statutes. See Brief for
The American Bar Association (amicus curiae), app., Coy (No. 86-6757). The relatively simple
screen procedure at issue in Coy did not present the proper opportunity for the Court to explore the
more complex confrontation issues presented by television and videotape procedures. For example,
four state statutes authorize child testimony via two-way closed circuit telvision. See, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp. 1988). Such statues require the child to testify from an adjacent
room while the defendant, judge, and jury remain in the courtroom. The child's image is projected
into the courtroom and a simultaneous image of the defendant is projected to the child. Some commentators have questioned whether this "electronic confrontation" comports with a literal interpretation of confrontation. See eg., Comment, The Criminal Videotape Tdal: Serious Constitutional
Questions, 55 OR. L. REv. 567, 576-78 (1976); Comment, Closed Circuit Television Testimony for
Sexually Abused Children" The Right to Avoid Confrontation?, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 117
(1987); Note, The Constitutionalityof the Use of Two-Way Closed Circuit Television to Take Testimony ofChild Victims ofSex Crimes, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 995 (1985); Annotation, Closed Circuit
Television Witness Examination, 61 A.L.R. 4TH 1155 (1988) (collecting cases).
In any closed circuit television system, whether one-way or two-way, the child is visible to the
jury only over a television monitor. At least one court has questioned the constitutionality of this
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exception criteria, but only concluded summarily that the Iowa statute was inva-

63
lid under the first prong for failure to require individualized necessity findings.

A careful analysis of the Coy criteria, however, suggests that its strict application can define constitutionally permissible and beneficial confrontation
exceptions."
The Coy plurality indicated that the first prong of its test-the necessity
requirement-could be fulfilled only by a finding that a confrontation exception
was necessary to the case at bar.64 Both Justice Scalia and Justice O'Connor
indicated that necessity should be determined by considering the adverse effect
of confrontation on the potential child witness. 65 Neither Justice specified the
requisite severity of the harmful effect that must result to the child, but the
portion of the plurality opinion suggesting that the costs of the defendant's constitutional protections will have to be borne by the innocent witness 66 indicates
that "mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to testify" 67 is insufficient to support an exception. A sexual abuse victim is typically a reticent witness, especially when the defendant is a relative. 68 Predicating a confrontation
exception on such a lenient showing of necessity would be tantamount to ac'69
cepting the forbidden statutory "presumption of trauma.
The second prong of the Coy test requires that the proposed visual-confrontation exception further an important public policy. 70 The public policy that the
Iowa legislature sought to further by its child witness protection statute, and the
one the Court assumed to be at issue, was the protection of child sexual abuse
victims from the trauma resulting from courtroom testimony. 7 1 There is judicial precedent for this concern. In Globe Newspaper Co. v. SuperiorCourt72 the
diminished quality of demeanor evidence. Hochheiser v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 78687, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273, 278-79 (1984). Several courts have determined that the television image is
adequate to meet the constitutional demands for demeanor evidence. See, eg., Commonwealth v.
Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 230 (Ky. 1986); State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 431, 484 A.2d 1330,
1342-43 (1984); People v. Algarin, 129 Misc. 2d 1016, 1022, 498 N.Y.S.2d 977, 981 (1986).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28 & 35.
64. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803. The concurring justices agreed with this point. Id. at 2805
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 28 & 34.
66. See supra text accompanying note 25.
67. Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 524, 530 A.2d 275, 288-89 (1987).
68. Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 230 (Ky. 1986); Wildermuth, 310 Md. at 516,
530 A.2d at 285.
69. Coy, 108 S. Ct at 2803. Louisiana has applied a standard of "reasonably necessary," which
was found to be satisfied when the "child would not testify as to any details of the alleged offense and
appeared to be reluctant to testify in the presence of the defendant." Willis, 716 S.W.2d at 230-31
(construing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:283 (West Supp. 1987)). New Mexico requires a showing
that the child "may be unable to testify without suffering unreasonable and unnecessary mental or
emotional harm." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (1986). This may be satisfied by a psychologist's
testimony that "requiring the child to testify before a jury would be a frightening experience, would
undermine the child's therapeutic progress, and would also be an unreasonable imposition on the
child." State v. Vigil, 103 N.M. 583, 585, 711 P.2d 28, 30 (1985).
70. Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2803.
71. "In enacting the challenged statute, the Iowa legislature stated its purpose: to 'assure the
fair and compassionate treatment of victims' and to 'protect them from intimidation and further
injury, [and] assist them in overcoming emotional and economic hardships resulting from criminal
acts .... '" Appellee's Brief at 13, Coy (No. 86-6757) (quoting 1986 Iowa Acts ch. 1178).
72. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
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Supreme Court announced that the public interest in the "protection of minor
victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment... is a compelling one."17 3 The dispositive issues in Globe and Coy are only superficially similar, however. In Globe a newspaper company challenged a Massachusetts
statute that barred public access to the courtroom during the victim's testimony
in any child sexual abuse trial. The Globe Court asserted that "the measure of
the State's interest [in protecting child witnesses] lies not in the extent to which
minor victims are injured by testifying, but rather in the incremental injury suffered by testifying in the presence of the press and the generalpublic. 17 4 However, the benefit contemplated by the Coy procedure-merely blocking the
child's view of the defendant--cannot be a decrease in the frightening effect of a
harsh and unfamiliar courtroom. Logically, this separation can only be an attempt to protect the child from the trauma resulting from the close presence of
the defendant himself. An assumption that the victim will be traumatized by
exposure to the defendant requires an antecedent presumption of the defendant's
culpability. Thus, the Coy test ultimately pits the defendant's right to due process of law"7 against the public policy of protecting children. In contrast, Globe
calls only for the balancing of the interests of child protection and public access
to trials. The greater weight of a due process concern may overbalance the public interest of protecting children and may be insufficient to support a Coy-type

visual-confrontation exception. Manipulation of the Coy test's second prong
may be necessary before a procedure shielding a child victim from the accused
76
will be constitutionally acceptable.
73. Id. at 607.
74. Id. n.19.
75. Due process "protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Thus, the presumption of innocence must be maintained throughout judicial proceedings. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 459 (1895). The due process problem
presented by child protective procedures was recognized in an early decision reversing a trial court's
ruling that a reticent witness could turn her back to the defendant:
When the witness stated, in the presence of the jury, that she was afraid to tell, because she was afraid of the defendant, the court, without further comment, or cross-examination of the witness ordered the defendant away, out of the sight and hearing of the
witness. From this order the jury might draw the inference that the court not only believed
her statement, but believed the witness had good reasons for making the statement. The
order was consequently prejudicial to the defendant.
State v. Mannion, 19 Utah 505, 513, 57 P. 542, 544 (1899).
The Coy plurality did not reach the due process issue. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803. The dissenters
considered the issue, but determined that an obstructing screen did not create an impression of guilt
because it "is not the sort of trapping that generally is associated with those who have been convicted." Id. at 2810 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). This overlooks defendant Coy's strong argument

that:
The jury was encouraged to speculate as to the existence of inculpatory evidence, not admissible at trial, that would explain the need for the extraordinary in-court arrangement
The jurors, although required to presume the appellant's innocence until proven
guilty, inevitably considered the one-way screening device as irrebutable evidence of guilt.
Appellant's Brief at 18, Coy (No. 86-6757).
76. The due process problem presented also may be addressed through manipulation of the
necessity requirements. A lenient necessity standard may be appropriate to bar public access to a sex
abuse trial, but a "difficult standard [is appropriate] when dealing with matters involving the constitutional rights of a presumptively innocent defendant." Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 523, 530
A.2d 275, 288 (1987); see infra text accompanying notes 94-96.
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The Coy Court's failure to provide a complete analysis of its exception test
can be remedied in part by an analogy to standards applicable in another confrontation exception: the admission of hearsay. Of course, whether an excep77
tion to the face-to-face rule will ever be allowed under the Coy test is unclear.
Nor is it clear whether the criteria supporting a hearsay exception will suffice to
support a visual-confrontation exception. The standards for admissible hearsay,
however, can provide the minimum requirements for a Coy exception. The
Supreme Court has noted three specific rights implied by the confrontation
clause that the defendant cannot realize when hearsay is admitted: the right to
have a witness testify under oath, the right to cross-examination, and the right to
78
have the jury assess the credibility of the declarant by observing his demeanor.
It would be illogical to predicate an exception to the essential visual confrontation right on standards more lenient than those required for exceptions to these
mere "implications" 79 of the confrontation clause.
In order to provide the defendant his constitutional guarantee to a determination of guilt or innocence based on reasonably accurate facts, hearsay is admissible only when it "is marked with such trustworthiness" that the substantial
truth-enhancing advantage of the confrontation right is preserved. 80 If evidence
falls into a hearsay exception "firmly... rooted in our jurisprudence," it meets
this reliability requirement per se.81 Otherwise, hearsay is considered sufficiently
reliable only when the defendant has exercised the opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant at a prior proceeding.8 2
Even "reliable" hearsay may be admitted only ifjustified by "considerations
of public policy and the necessities of the case."' 8 3 A litigant may establish ne77. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
78. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158
(1970)).
79. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802.
80. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
81. Boujaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2783 (1987) (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
74 (1970)); see also Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (1980) ("Reliability can be inferred without more in a
case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception."); Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284, 298-99 (1973) ("A number of exceptions have developed over the years to allow admission of hearsay statements made under circumstances that tend to assure reliability and thereby
compensate for the absence of the oath and opportunity for cross-examination."). But see California
v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970) ("While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the
Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, it is quite a different thing to
suggest that the overlap is complete and that the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a
codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed at common law.").
82. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 70-71 (1980) (permissible to admit sworn preliminary hearing testimony of witness unavailable at time of trial); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972) (same);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965) (same); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) (not
error to admit prior trial testimony on retrial when declarant had died in the interim); see also
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722 (1968) ("the right of cross examination initially afforded provides
substanital compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement"). This requirement
of prior cross-examination is consistent with the Court's former position that cross-examination is
the primary purpose of confrontation. See supra note 54.
The Court has suggested that even the unexercised opportunity to cross-examine will fulfill the
reliability requirement. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 69-70; California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165
(1970).
83. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243.
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cessity by demonstrating unavailability of the declarant.8 4 The public policy
contemplated is "every jurisdiction['s] . . .strong interest in effective law enforcement."' 85 This public interest in conducting reasonably effective prosecu-

tions will not be sacrificed where the defendant has already realized the

86
substantial truth-enhancing benefit of confrontation.
At least one state-Maryland-has used a hearsay analysis in addressing
confrontation issues that have arisen in connection with its child witness protection statute. 87 The Maryland statute88 authorizes victim testimony via one-way
closed circuit television upon a finding that a face-to-face encounter with the
defendant "will result in ...serious emotional distress such that the child can-

not reasonably communicate." 8 9 The Maryland Court of Appeals has compared

this degree of emotional distress with the necessity requirement of the Supreme

Court's analysis for hearsay admission, 90 and has concluded that a finding that

the child cannot reasonably communicate "is tantamount to a finding of unavailability." 91 Both the Maryland Court of Appeals and the Maryland Court of
84. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74; Barber, 390 U.S. at 722.
85. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64; see also Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243 (public has interest in conducting
reasonably vigorous prosecutions).
86. See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243 ("The law in its wisdom declares that the rights of the public
shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the accused.").
87. See Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 514-25, 530 A.2d 275, 284-89 (1987); Craig v. State,
76 Md. App. 250, 544 A.2d 784, 800-01 (1988). For the purposes of this Note, the reliability aspect
of the hearsay exception test has been omitted in the discussion of the Maryland statute. Before Coy,
the Maryland court was confident that trustworthiness was assured because the statute "provides for
most of the aspects of confrontation that enhance the reliability of testimony: cross-examination,
testimony under oath, [and] ability of judge, jury, and accused to view the witness during the testimony." Wildermuth, 310 Md. at 515, 530 A.2d at 285. In the context of the hearsay exception test,
of course, the Coy decisions leaves unanswered the question of whether the reliability prong can ever
be fulfilled without a face-to-face encounter. In a post-Coy case, the Maryland court ducked the
reliability question by noting that any language in Coy suggesting the unconstitutionality of all exceptions to the visual-confrontation rule was endorsed by only four Justices. Craig, 76 Md. App.
250, 544 A.2d at 798-99.
88. The Maryland statute provides:
(a)(1). ..a court may order that testimony of a child victim be taken outside the courtroom and shown in the courtroom by means of closed circuit telvision if:
ii)" *The judge determines that testimony by the child victim in the courtroom will
result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably
communicate.
(b)(1) Only the following persons may be in the room with the child...
(i) The prosecuting attorney;
(ii) The attorney for the defendant;
(ii) The operators of the closed circuit television equipment; and
(iv) ...any person whose presence... contributes to the well-being of the child ....
MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.§ 9-102 (1988 Com. Supp.). This statute differs from the Iowa
statute, see supra note 7, in that it provides for the child's removal from the courtroom. It raises the
same issue as the Iowa statute, however, because it also provides for visual separation of the defendant and the complaining witness.
89. Id. § 9-102(a)(1)(ii).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
91. Wildermuth, 310 Md. at 519, 530 A.2d at 286; see also People v. Johnson, 146 11. App. 3d
640, 646, 497 N.E.2d 308, 312 (1986) (what is required is not the physical availability of a child
witness, but his competent testimony), rev'd, 118 Ill.2d 501, 517 N.E.2d 1070, 1074-75 (1987) (use of
protective procedure improper in absence of statutory authority).
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Special Appeals have emphasized that necessity findings must be individualized
to the child in question. Thus, an expert psychologist's testimony that most
young children would find it "hard to respond" in the courtroom not only fell
short of demonstrating unavailability, but also failed to focus adequately on the
individual child.92 Expert opinion that a potential child witness' reaction to
withdraw and curl
confrontation "'would probably [be to] stop talking and...
93
unavailability.
show
to
sufficient
however,
was,
up'
The Maryland courts have recognized that permitting the witness-protection procedure only when the child's testimony otherwise would be unavailable
ensures that a confrontation exception will be allowed only when necessary to
preserve the public interest in law enforcement. 94 Relaxation of the confrontation clause to protect this public interest is consistent with the United 95States
Supreme Court's constitutional analysis for the admissibility of hearsay.
The Maryland courts further have reasoned that allowing an exception to
the strict confrontation rule when the child could not otherwise communicate
benefits not only the public, but also the child and, perhaps, the defendant:
"Keeping in mind the threshold requirement [of unavailability] ... what is to be
gained from forcing a child-victim to testify in the direct presence of the defendthe child rather than
ant when the only product of it will be further suffering for
96
any meaningful evidence-inculpatory or exculpatory?"
The "hearsay" analysis of the Maryland statute provides substance that can
be imposed on the bare prongs of the Coy exception test. Under the Maryland
analysis, the Coy necessity prong would be fulfilled only by a showing that the
child's testimony will be unavailable if a confrontation is forced. This rigorous
necessity standard ensures that the public policy to be furthered under Coy's
second prong is the strong public interest in effective law enforcement. The shift
in focus from protection of the child, assumed by the Coy Court to be the policy
at issue, to the public interest in law enforcement, the focal policy in the hearsay
analysis, alleviates a nagging due process problem lurking in the Coy exception
test. The Coy test poses the danger of sacrificing the constitutionally guaranteed
procedural rights of a presumptively innocent defendant, possibly at great cost
to him, in order to provide a benefit of uncertain existence and magnitude to the
complaining witness. Under the Maryland analysis, however, both parties are
incidentally protected. The child is benefited by being spared what evidence
shows would be an intensely traumatizing experience. The defendant retains the
right to benefit from any exculpatory evidence made available through the
child's testimony. In addition, the public is not deprived of the opportunity to
conduct a reasonable prosecution of a crime that is often difficult or impossible
92. Wildermuth, 310 Md. at 522-23, 530 A.2d at 288.

93. Craig v. State, 76 Md. App. 250, 544 A.2d 784, 801 (1988).
the child-victim is... so 'traumatized' by a face-to-face confrontation as to be unable
94. "[I]f
to 'reasonably communicate'-the truth of the matter might never be revealed, a terrible crime
might go unredressed, and a dangerous person might be turned loose to continue his or her predation. .. ." Id. 76 Md. App. 250, 544 A.2d at 800.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 83-89.
96. Craig, 76 Md. App. 250, 544 A.2d at 800.
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to prove absent testimony of the victim. 9 7
Wisely, the Supreme Court in Coy did not lock the door on visual-confrontation exceptions. Unfortunately, however, the Court failed to present a clearcut analysis to guide the state courts that must now struggle to apply or reject
their own state statutes. The hearsay analysis employed by the Maryland courts
and discussed in this Note represents minimum standards for a confrontation
exception under Coy. Whether these minimum standards will be sufficient to
support an exception to the "irreducible literal meaning" of the confrontation
clause remains to be seen. 98 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has left
itself free to reject any future application of the Coy test, even to the point of
declaring the visual confrontation right absolute and exceptionless. An unyielding right to confrontation, however, can be self-defeating. When the child victim is so traumatized that she cannot produce useful testimony in the
defendant's presence, strict preclusion of confrontation exceptions would frustrate the interests of all involved parties: the defendant's right to a determination of guilt or innocence based on reasonably accurate facts, society's interest in
effective law enforcement, and the important public policy of protecting innocent children from needless mental anguish. 99
JAYE POWELL MEYER

97. Comment, The Young Victim as Witnessfor the Prosecution: Another Form of Abuse?, 89

Dicx. L. REv. 721, 731 (1985).
98. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.

99. At least one legislature has recognized the interrelationship of these three policies in the
child witness protection arena:
It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this section to provide the court with

discretion to employ unusual court procedures to protect the rights of a child witness, the
rights of the defendant, and the integrity of the judicial process. In exercising its discretion, the court necessarily will be required to balance the rights of the defendant against the
need to protect a child witness and to preserve the integrity of the court's truthfinding
function.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(a) (West Supp. 1988).

